Why Industrial Chemical Scammers Operate Through Mombasa Port (Using CIF/CFR Incoterms)

Mombasa Port in Kenya is East Africa’s largest seaport and a major gateway for regional trade. Mombasa’s prominence in international shipping has unfortunately made it a hotspot for certain fraud schemes. In recent years, many industrial chemical scammers have been found to prefer conducting their schemes through Mombasa, Kenya – often structuring deals under CIF (Cost, Insurance, and Freight) or CFR (Cost and Freight) trade terms. This article explores why Mombasa Port is commonly used in such scams, examining the port’s regulatory environment, enforcement challenges, and logistical factors. It also explains how CIF/CFR Incoterms can be exploited by scammers to provide cover for fraudulent documents, fake deliveries, or advance-fee scams. Throughout, we’ll reference expert insights and real cases to illuminate these fraud patterns.

Mombasa Port’s Appeal to Fraudsters: High Trade Volume and Regional Reach

Mombasa is the busiest port in East Africa, handling enormous cargo volumes and serving as a gateway to multiple countries in the region . In 2024 alone, it processed over 41 million tonnes of cargo and surpassed 2 million TEUs (containers), with Uganda and other inland nations relying heavily on Mombasa for transit trade  . This high throughput and wide reach make the port an attractive stage for scams. Simply put, the more cargo and complexity, the easier it is for illicit activities to hide in plain sight. A fraudulently shipped container can more easily blend into the flow at a busy hub than at a minor port.



Another factor is the port’s role in serving landlocked countries. Scammers often incorporate cross-border transit into their schemes – for example, arranging shipments destined for Uganda, the DRC, or Rwanda via Mombasa. This adds layers of logistical complexity that fraudsters exploit. Goods may legitimately pass through multiple hands (shipping lines, port storage, trucking companies, border customs) before reaching the final destination, creating opportunities to tamper with or divert cargo unnoticed. As one legal analysis noted, a common ploy is to route goods to a fake branch office in Uganda: the fraudster convinces a supplier to ship goods to “their Uganda branch” through Mombasa, then diverts the cargo en route inland  . By the time the legitimate seller realizes something is wrong, the goods have vanished somewhere after clearing Mombasa Port.

The sheer scale of trade at Mombasa also poses verification challenges. For a buyer or seller overseas, confirming whether a given shipment actually arrived or what became of it can be difficult without on-the-ground agents. Scammers count on this distance and opacity. An overseas victim may have little means to physically check a container’s status in Mombasa, giving the fraudster cover to claim “it’s in the port, trust us” or to use falsified evidence of shipment.

Regulatory and Enforcement Gaps at Mombasa Port

Compounding the above is Mombasa Port’s history of enforcement challenges. The port and associated customs authorities have battled issues like corruption, document fraud, and insufficient oversight for years. A Kenyan government probe found serious corruption problems at Mombasa, noting that bribery of customs and police officers was enabling illicit trade and hampering proper inspections . Outdated equipment and overwhelming cargo volumes were cited as factors that made it “difficult for officers to closely scrutinize containers” passing through . In practice, this means contraband or misdeclared shipments can slip by, and fraudulent paperwork may not always be caught in time.

Notably, there have been documented cases of fake shipping documents being used to clear cargo at Mombasa. A P&I Club (maritime insurer) alert reported multiple incidents of container cargo being released against fraudulent bills of lading in African ports – “particularly in Mombasa” – where forged documents looked genuine enough that port staff released goods to the wrong party . In one case, scammers even printed a fake bill of lading on an actual shipping line’s stationery with matching security features . These incidents resulted in cargo losses for the rightful owners and highlight a critical vulnerability: if port or shipping agents accept bogus paperwork at face value, scammers can physically obtain goods that aren’t theirs.

There are also signs of insider collusion in some scams. Kenya’s Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) noted in 2023–2024 that certain gold and mineral fraud rings shifted operations to Mombasa, possibly leveraging contacts at the port or airport to evade detection . For instance, one high-profile scam involved fraudsters in Kenya who duped a foreign buyer into paying KSh 151 million for “tantalum” minerals; the criminals delivered a container of sand through Mombasa Port instead of the valuable ore . The fact that they chose Mombasa as the handover point – and managed to get a container of sand shipped or passed off as ore – suggests they found the port environment conducive to their deception. Whether through corrupt officials or simply the chaotic nature of a busy port, Mombasa afforded them the cover to attempt a fake delivery on a grand scale.

In summary, Mombasa’s regulatory cracks (from corrupt insiders to document verification lapses) provide an opening that scammers eagerly exploit. The port’s authorities have attempted crackdowns – e.g. sacking over 100 staff for fake credentials and fraud in one audit  – but the very necessity of such actions indicates the depth of the problem. For fraudsters, a port where oversight is stretched thin or compromised is an ideal playground.

The CIF/CFR Incoterm Advantage: How Scammers Leverage Shipping Terms

On top of choosing a favorable location, scammers also tailor the terms of the trade deal to serve their scheme. Many fraudulent schemes involving industrial chemicals or commodities are structured under CIF or CFR incoterms. Under these terms, the seller is responsible for arranging and paying for the carriage of goods to the destination port (Mombasa in this context), with CIF also requiring insurance coverage. The buyer’s obligation is typically to pay upon receiving shipping documents or when the goods arrive, depending on the contract.

This setup presents multiple advantages to a scammer, whether they are posing as the seller or the buyer:

• Shifting Shipping Responsibility: By insisting on CIF/CFR, scammers ensure that the burden of shipping falls on the other party. If the scammer is pretending to buy goods, they will push the real seller to ship the product all the way to Mombasa at the seller’s cost. The seller arranges freight and even insurance (in CIF) to the named port. This means the scammer (as “buyer”) expends nothing on logistics, yet the goods come into their territory or reach a point where they can seize them. In a documented case, a fraudster impersonated a procurement officer of a major company and convinced a Chinese chemical manufacturer to export 10 containers of nylon chips CIF Mombasa with 60-day payment terms . The Chinese company shipped the containers under CIF, trusting they’d be paid after the bill of lading date – but the “buyer” never intended to pay, and only wanted the goods delivered into East Africa.
• Access to Original Documents: CIF/CFR trades usually involve the seller providing the buyer with original shipping documents (especially the Bill of Lading, which is the key to claiming the goods at the port). A scammer buyer will eagerly obtain these papers. For example, in the nylon chips scam above, the fraudster insisted the original B/L and documents be couriered to them once the goods shipped, which the seller dutifully did . Armed with the original bill of lading naming their front company as consignee, the scammer can claim the cargo upon arrival in Mombasa – even if payment hasn’t been made. Possession of the B/L effectively equals possession of the goods under such incoterms, a fact scammers exploit ruthlessly.
• Delayed or No Payment: CIF/CFR deals can be structured with payment on credit (e.g. 30 or 60 days after shipment, or via a letter of credit to be paid at sight of documents). Fraudsters often insist on payment after delivery or after document receipt, maximizing the window in which they can disappear with goods or money. In one Ugandan-bound shipment fraud, the scammer negotiated 100% payment 10 days after receiving the bill of lading, which gave them time to clear the cargo and vanish without paying the Chinese supplier . In another case, scammers promised to pay a supplier by a certain date after shipment, then simply never paid once they had the goods, an act explicitly recognized as fraud in court . CIF terms, when coupled with unverified buyers and extended payment terms, effectively let scammers get goods on credit and default deliberately.
• Seller-Side Scams: Scammers can also pose as sellers offering goods CIF to a buyer. In this scenario, the use of CIF/CFR can lure legitimate buyers because the seller (the scammer) appears to be taking on the hassle of freight and insurance. The buyer might think they’re getting a convenient deal (“delivery to my port included”). The scammer then asks for upfront payment or deposit against the CIF contract. Since CIF requires providing documents for the buyer to collect goods, a fraudulent seller can forge those documents to claim shipment and demand payment release. For instance, if a buyer opens a letter of credit payable against a set of CIF shipping documents, a scammer could present phony bills of lading, inspection certificates, etc., to trigger payment without ever shipping real product. A North of England P&I Club warning noted exactly this risk: in some African ports, cargo was delivered out on fake bills of lading that looked authentic . Such forged paperwork could just as easily be used to trick a bank or buyer into paying, under the assumption that the goods are en route. In short, CIF/CFR give fraudulent sellers a document-based facade to hide behind.
• Cover for “Extra” Charges Scams: CIF and CFR deals can involve various fees (freight, insurance, port charges) which scammers twist into advance-fee opportunities. A scammer seller might tell the victim, “The goods are in Mombasa, but you need to pay insurance clearance or port handling fees before we release them to you.” Unwary buyers have been duped into paying such fake charges, thinking it’s part of normal CIF logistics. One common ruse reported is an email or message saying “Your consignment has arrived at Mombasa port; please pay X for a clearance stamp/tax” – only for the fee to disappear into the fraudster’s pocket and no goods to materialize . By invoking plausible-sounding shipping terms and fees, scammers add legitimacy to their requests for upfront money.

In summary, CIF and CFR incoterms are favored because they shift most shipping duties to the victim and revolve around documents and trust. The scammer either gets goods into their possession before paying, or gets the buyer’s money before delivering – all under the cover of standard international trade practice. The incoterms themselves are legitimate and widely used in honest trade, but fraudsters manipulate the expectations around them. Whether by withholding payment on a CIF shipment or providing falsified proof of a CFR shipment, they play the system to their benefit.

Fraud Techniques: Fake Documents, Phantom Cargoes, and Swapouts

To carry out these schemes, scammers employ a toolbox of deceit centered on documentation and the opaqueness of shipping. Some key fraudulent techniques include:

• Forged Bills of Lading and Papers: As noted, a bill of lading (B/L) is like a passport for cargo – it’s the document a port or carrier uses to release goods to the holder. Scammers have become adept at forging B/Ls and related papers. In cases tied to Mombasa, criminals have used forged B/Ls to clear containers without the seller’s knowledge or consent . In one incident, a fake B/L (complete with genuine-looking serial numbers and watermarks) fooled the local shipping agent, resulting in a container being handed to the fraudster who never paid for the contents . By the time the true owner raised alarm, that container was long gone. Forgery isn’t limited to B/Ls – purchase orders, quality certificates, letters of credit, insurance documents – all can be fabricated or tampered with. The goal is to provide just enough authenticity that officials or trading partners don’t notice until the scammer has gained what they want (goods or funds). Mombasa’s busy port environment can make it harder to spot a sophisticated fake promptly, giving scammers a better chance of success .
• Rapid Clearance and Disappearance: When the target of the scam is tangible goods (like chemicals or minerals being stolen), speed is the scammer’s ally. Fraudsters operating through Mombasa often arrange to clear cargo immediately on arrival and whisk it away before questions arise. In the OLM Advocates analysis of a common scheme, the cargo was “quickly cleared and loaded onto trucks” as soon as it arrived at Mombasa, then shuttled through multiple truck swaps to shake off tracking . This tactic of rapidly moving the goods out of the port (and even across borders) makes recovery extremely difficult. By the time the seller realizes no payment is coming, the goods have been broken up or sold elsewhere. Mombasa’s high traffic can aid this – with thousands of containers moving, one container’s swift exit is hardly remarkable, and bribed officials can expedite the process.
• Fake Delivery and Substitution: Some scammers don’t need real goods at all – they deliver empty or false-value cargo and count on the victim not discovering it until the fraudsters are gone. The tantalum mineral scam is a textbook example: the perpetrators delivered a container of sand while claiming it was high-grade ore . In another Kenyan case, scammers sold what was supposed to be gold but turned out to be crushed padlocks – essentially scrap metal – once the barrels were opened . In the context of industrial chemicals, a scammer might ship barrels of colored water or common compounds instead of the expensive chemical ordered. CIF terms could help here as well, since the buyer only gets to inspect the contents at the destination port after possibly having paid or at least paid the freight. If the scammer has already pocketed the money (or intends to vanish regardless), delivering worthless goods is just another way to cover their tracks. Mombasa Port, as a handoff point, gives a fraudulent seller the appearance of fulfilling their deal – the buyer hears the goods arrived in Mombasa (maybe even receives a container number and a bill of lading), creating false reassurance, until they eventually find out the shipment was a dud.
• Advance Fee Extortion: As touched on earlier, many scams involve tricking the victim into paying fees or advances that are not actually required. In the context of CIF/CFR and Mombasa, fraudsters exploit the complexity of international shipments by inventing convincing-sounding charges. A victim might receive official-looking emails or calls stating that “Kenya Revenue Authority needs an import permit fee” or “insurance for hazardous chemical must be paid before unloading at Mombasa”. These urgent requests often come with threats that the goods will be impounded or delayed – pressuring the victim to pay quickly. Since real international shipments do involve various fees (e.g. customs duties, port storage, inspection fees), a less experienced trader can be fooled. Scammers have impersonated shipping agents or customs officers to bolster this con. The end result is the victim wires a few thousand dollars (or much more) for what they think are legitimate charges, only to later learn it was all fake. The goods, of course, either never existed or were never truly in jeopardy because the entire shipping story was fabricated.

Each of these techniques takes advantage of the trust and distance inherent in global trade. International chemical purchases often involve parties who never meet in person and rely on email communications and couriered documents. Mombasa adds an extra layer of distance for many victims (who might be in China, Europe, or elsewhere), and CIF/CFR terms add a layer of plausible complexity (shipping lines, insurance, ports). For the scammer, it’s the perfect cover – they manipulate the paperwork and processes that legitimate trade relies on. By the time the fraud is uncovered, they have moved on.

Real-World Examples Illustrating the Pattern

To concretely understand why scammers gravitate to Mombasa and CIF deals, it helps to look at a few real cases and patterns that have emerged in recent years:

• The Nylon Chips Swindle (2023): A Chinese manufacturer of industrial nylon chips was contacted by a person posing as a procurement officer for a well-known multinational chemical company. The “buyer” requested a large order (10 containers) on CIF Mombasa terms with payment 60 days after shipment. They provided convincing purchase orders and even had a fake corporate email domain. Trusting this, the Chinese firm shipped the containers to Mombasa and sent the original documents to the buyer  . Once the goods arrived, the scammers (operating via a shell company in Uganda) collected the cargo from Mombasa Port and vanished without payment. Kenyan court records later showed the fraudsters misrepresented themselves as part of PPG Industries (a real company) and deceived the seller into essentially giving 5 containers of product on credit . This case mirrors a common scheme described by trade lawyers, where scammers target chemical and fertilizer suppliers, ask for CIF delivery to East Africa, then abscond with the goods  .
• Solar Panels to Nowhere (2024): In a similar vein, a Chinese solar equipment exporter agreed to sell several container-loads of panels to a UK-registered company, destined for Uganda via Mombasa. The contract stipulated payment within days after the buyer got the shipping documents. The seller emailed a draft bill of lading as proof of shipment – and the buyer used a forged version of that B/L to clear one container in Mombasa without paying  . By the time the seller realized something was wrong, one container had been stolen and only the intervention of port police saved the remaining ones. The High Court in Mombasa later confirmed the “buyer” was a fraudster and ordered the return of the goods . This example underscores how a scammer can leverage quick action at the port and document forgery to steal goods under CIF/CFR arrangements.
• Mineral and Chemical “Investor” Scams: Kenya has seen a surge in scams involving supposed sales of gold, diamonds, or industrial minerals (like coltan or tantalum) and chemicals used in mining. These often target foreign investors. A recurring element is the use of Mombasa (port or airport) as the transaction point. The DCI’s report on gold scams noted the shift of operations to Mombasa, meaning fraudsters invite the buyer to witness or receive the shipment there . In one instance, a Chinese buyer was enticed with a lucrative deal for tantalum delivered through Mombasa, only to receive sand as mentioned earlier . Another case involved promises of mercury (an industrial chemical used in gold extraction) shipped CIF to an African port – after upfront payment, the “suppliers” disappeared. These scams pick Mombasa because it’s a plausible export route (many genuine mineral shipments exit Africa via Mombasa) and because once the victim’s money is in hand, the fraudsters can use the busy port as a smoke screen, claiming “the shipment must have been delayed or seized” to buy time.
• Advance Fee Consignment Scams: There have also been lower-scale but widespread scams where victims are told a package or consignment is waiting for them at Mombasa Port or Moi International Airport, but they must pay fees to release it. For example, victims get emails saying “Your chemical shipment has arrived in Mombasa – pay the clearance fee via wire transfer.” These are classic advance fee frauds leveraging the port’s name. Kenya’s authorities have had to issue public warnings about such ploys, as no legitimate customs process asks random individuals to pay via mobile money for a delivery release. Nonetheless, the use of Mombasa in the story gives it a veneer of legitimacy for those who are expecting an international delivery. Scammers even create fake KRA (Kenya Revenue Authority) receipts or port documents to support their claims, knowing it’s hard for a layperson to distinguish a real one from a forgery.

Each of these real-world cases reinforces the same themes: Mombasa Port offers access and anonymity, and CIF/CFR terms provide the deceptive framework. Industrial chemicals, being high-value and often shipped in bulk, are prime targets – they can be resold locally or simply serve as the bait in a con. The port’s environment enables quick turnover of stolen goods or convincing lies about shipments, while the incoterms enable scammers to manipulate the timing and evidence of transactions.

Why Mombasa? Logistical and Regional Vulnerabilities

Delving deeper, why don’t scammers choose other ports? What is it about Mombasa specifically? A few reasons stand out:

• Logistical Hub Status: Mombasa is not just Kenya’s port but the main maritime outlet for Uganda, South Sudan, eastern DRC, Rwanda, and parts of Tanzania. This means a scammer can claim to be operating in any of those places yet plausibly route goods through Mombasa. For example, an impostor in Nairobi or Kampala will find it believable to a seller in Europe that “we import via Mombasa.” The port’s far-reaching connectivity thus widens the pool of potential victims and schemes.
• High Volume, Lower Scrutiny: As mentioned, the immense throughput makes 100% screening impossible. Compared to a smaller port where a few rogue shipments might draw attention, Mombasa processes thousands of containers weekly. Scammers prefer environments where they are just a face in the crowd. High cargo volume can also mean delays in updating tracking information or resolving discrepancies, which scammers take advantage of. If a victim inquires about a shipment, the fraudster can blame port congestion or clerical delays – common occurrences in busy ports – to stall for time.
• Transit Cargo Loopholes: Much of the cargo through Mombasa is in transit, meaning it’s not officially “imported” into Kenya and thus may undergo less stringent inspection (since it’s destined for elsewhere). Historically, some goods declared as transit have been diverted into the local market tax-free, indicating weak controls. Fraudsters piggyback on this by structuring scams as transit shipments. In the Uganda-bound scams, for instance, once the goods left the port for transit, Kenyan authorities had limited responsibility, and Ugandan authorities were not yet in the loop – a gap the criminals fully exploited . If something goes awry in that no-man’s-land between jurisdictions, each side might assume the other is handling it, letting the scam slip through.
• Difficulty of International Law Enforcement: When a scam spans multiple countries (e.g., a Chinese seller, a Kenyan port, a Ugandan consignee, an offshore shell company), it complicates the pursuit of justice. Scammers know that cross-border crimes are harder to investigate and prosecute. Mombasa is ideally situated for such complexity: it naturally involves cross-border trade. A victim might have to coordinate with Kenyan police, their own national authorities, and maybe neighboring country authorities. This is daunting and time-consuming, often discouraging victims from even trying. Meanwhile, the fraudster can relocate to a new base. In essence, Mombasa offers an international cloak – the crime doesn’t squarely fall in one jurisdiction, which the scammer exploits to evade punishment.
• Past Success Breeds Imitation: Lastly, word gets around (in the underworld too). If a particular port or method proves lucrative, others will copy it. Mombasa’s name recurs in scam reports from the past decade, suggesting that multiple groups have successfully pulled off frauds there. This creates a vicious circle: each new scam story associated with Mombasa may attract another crook to try their luck, believing the port to be a “safe” venue for fraud. Trade experts and shipping insurers have flagged Mombasa (alongside a few other African ports) for high incidence of document fraud and cargo theft . Until those vulnerabilities are thoroughly addressed, the port will likely remain on scammers’ list of preferred operations centers.

Safeguards and Expert Advice for Traders

Understanding the problem is the first step toward prevention. Both industry experts and law enforcement agencies have issued guidance to help honest traders avoid falling victim to these Mombasa-related scams:

• Verify Who You’re Dealing With: Conduct rigorous due diligence on any new trading partner, especially if they propose unfamiliar arrangements. For sellers, that means verifying the supposed buyer’s identity, business registration, and reputation before shipping anything. Signs of trouble include use of generic email accounts, newly registered domains, or unverifiable addresses . If a “big” buyer inexplicably insists on using a free Gmail address or has a website full of typos, alarm bells should ring. Importers (buyers) likewise should verify that a prospective supplier actually exists and has a track record. It’s worth independently contacting the company that a person claims to represent, using official contact info (not what’s on a suspicious email).
• Be Wary of Unusual Trade Terms: Incoterms like CIF and CFR are standard, but pay attention to any payment terms that seem too relaxed or too rushed. Offers of long credit (30-60 days) to an unknown foreign buyer, or demands for large upfront deposits to an unknown seller, are red flags. Experts suggest using secure payment instruments – for example, a letter of credit confirmed by a reputable bank – rather than open-account terms with new partners. If the other party resists such secure methods, that’s a warning sign. As one law firm advised exporters, consider insisting on at least partial payment upfront or a shorter credit period so the buyer doesn’t get possession long before payment . Essentially, don’t ship your entire fortune on a promise.
• Control of Documents: If you do ship under CIF/CFR, exercise control over the original documents. Rather than sending the original bill of lading directly to a new buyer, use a bank escrow or only release documents against payment (if that’s part of the contract). There are also modern solutions like electronic bills of lading and shipment tracking that can add security. Shippers should alert their carrier and the port if they suspect any funny business – in some of the Kenya cases, swift legal action and port alerts helped sellers reclaim goods before they left the port gates . Shipping lines and agents in Mombasa can “flag” a shipment if fraud is reported, preventing release to the consignees, but they can only act if they’re informed in time.
• Extra Vigilance at Mombasa (and Similar Ports): Given Mombasa’s known issues, traders should exercise extra caution for transactions involving this port. This might mean hiring a reputable freight forwarding agent or inspection company to supervise the discharge and handover of goods. It could also mean double-checking any communications purportedly from Kenyan officials. For example, any unexpected fee requests should be cross-verified via official channels (e.g., directly call the port or customs office). The Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) periodically issues public notices about scams – staying informed of these can provide hints of the latest tactics. In general, treat any “urgent problem at Mombasa port, send money now” message with skepticism; officials do not use personal emails or messaging apps for financial transactions.
• Legal Recourse and Reporting: If the worst happens, it’s important to report the fraud to authorities in all relevant countries. While international cases are challenging, there have been successes – Kenyan authorities have shown willingness to cooperate, especially if the scam involves local criminals. In the cases cited, victims went to the High Court in Mombasa to get injunctions preventing further release of goods and to order return of their property  . These legal tools can be effective if pursued quickly. Insurers (if export credit insurance was in place) should be notified immediately too. Moreover, by reporting scams, you contribute to wider awareness; agencies like the DCI compile data on scam patterns and issue alerts to the public . This helps make the environment less hospitable for the next scam.

In the end, vigilance and verification are the best defenses. As the old adage goes, “trust, but verify.” International trade has inherent risks, but with due care—especially when dealing with high-risk locales or unusually generous terms—businesses can avoid most traps. The Port of Mombasa is striving to modernize and crack down on fraud, but until those efforts fully bear fruit, traders must keep their guard up.

Conclusion

The prevalence of industrial chemical scams funneling through Mombasa, Kenya, is a product of both opportunity and design. Opportunistic fraudsters see Mombasa’s bustling port and sometimes lax oversight as fertile ground to execute schemes under the radar. By leveraging CIF/CFR incoterms, they ingeniously turn the mechanics of global trade to their advantage – making honest parties bear the costs and risks while they orchestrate theft or deceit from afar. Whether by stealing goods without payment, tricking victims with phony paperwork, or extracting bogus fees, these scammers exploit the gaps between international business partners and the cracks in port enforcement.

Understanding why Mombasa is attractive to these bad actors shines a light on how such frauds can be prevented. It calls for heightened due diligence on trades routed through known vulnerable channels, improved verification of shipping documents, and stronger cooperation between port authorities and global traders to clamp down on fraud. For every scammer’s tactic outlined here, there is a countermeasure that an alert trader can employ. While Mombasa’s name may be infamous in scam circles today, continued efforts by authorities and awareness among businesses can ensure that legitimate trade thrives and the fraudsters find fewer shadows to hide in.

Sources:

• OLM Law Advocates LLP – Maritime Fraud & Cargo Theft in Kenya (analysis of scam operations through Mombasa port) 
• Kenya High Court (Mombasa) Judgments – Fujian Highsun v. PPG Industries EA (2023); Mingyang Solar v. Synthomer (2024) (real cases of CIF Mombasa trade scams involving non-payment and forged documents) 
• Standard Club Alert via ICS South Africa – Delivery of Cargo in African Ports against Fraudulent B/L (warning of cargo released on fake bills, especially in Mombasa)
• VOA News – Corruption at Mombasa Port (on customs enforcement issues contributing to fraud)
• TV47 Kenya – DCI Crackdown on Gold/Mining Scams (noting scammers shifting operations to Mombasa and example of fake tantalum delivery)